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THE USE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS'
SARAH L. INDERBITZIN, NICHOLAS TARG, JAMES L. BYRNES, AND BRUCE A.
JOHNSON"
The practice of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") and recovery for
natural resource damage assessments ("NRDAs") are not new to the United States
government. What is new is the increased awareness that ADR, which has been
effective in resolving disputes concerning the cleanup of hazardous material
("HAZMAT"), may also be useful in resolving NRDA disputes.
Part I of this article introduces ADR techniques which may be utilized as
part of a cooperative effort between parties to an NRDA. Part II outlines the
Department of the Interior's ("DOI" or "Department") NRDA regulations and
suggests "when" and "where" ADR techniques may be appropriate. Part III
compares and contrasts the negotiations concerning the Exxon Valdez oil spill,
which did not use ADR effectively, and those regarding the Megaborg oil spill
which did use ADR effectively. Finally, Part IV concludes that, although
agencies are not required to use ADR to resolve NRDA disputes, it is in effective
tool which agencies should consider when conducting assessments.
I. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
ADR-a term used frequently, recently, and often incorrectly. Is ADR
a recent discovery that will save society from becoming a litigious swamp where
one dare not take any action without an attorney present? Will the use of ADR
cause lawyers to become an endangered species? The answers to these questions
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are not known for sure, but are most likely "NO!" and "NO!"
Admittedly, the phrase "alternative dispute resolution" is relatively new,
at least in terms of common usage. In fact, Black's Law Dictionary did not
define it until its sixth edition, published in 1990:
[P]rocedures for settling disputes by means other than litigation;
e.g., by arbitration, mediation, mini-trials. Such procedures,
which are usually less costly and more expeditious, are
increasingly being used in commercial and labor disputes, divorce
actions, in resolving motor vehicle and medical malpractice tort
claims, and in other disputes that would likely otherwise involve
court litigation.'
The DOI has been a leader in resolving disputes through ADR before
resorting to litigation. Since its inception in 1849, the DOI has used a form of
arbitration in which either the Secretary of the Interior or an Administrative Law
Judge ("AL") acts as an arbitrator.2 The DOI allows an internal appeal of
subordinate officials' decisions on the use of public lands.3 An appellant must,
therefore, exhaust his intra-agency appeal rights prior to challenging such a
decision in the federal courts.4 While this process is not regarded as particularly
novel today, it represented a unique way of resolving public lands disputes in the
nineteenth century.
The DOI's administrative appeal system remains in effect, as mandated
by a number of federal statutes including the Administrative Procedure Act,5 the
Taylor Grazing Act of 1934,6 and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
of 1976.' Although the DOI's appeal system is adversarial, unlike cooperative
decisionmaking and mediation, it is still a form of ADR. However, ADR now
focuses not only on avoiding costly formal litigation in federal courts, but on
resolving disputes outside adversarial administrative forums.8  While these
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 78 (6th ed. 1990).
2. The Department conducts its administrative review through its Office of Hearings and Appeals
("OHA"), Hearing Division, with ALJs. See 43 C.F.R. § 4.1(a) (1994). Appeals are conducted by
Administrative Appeals Judges through OHA's constituent Boards of Appeals (i.e., Contract, Indian,
and Land). See id. § 4.1(b).
3. OHA exercises the delegated authority of the Secretary to hear and finally decide appeals of
subordinate agency officials' decisions. See id. § 4.403.
4. See, e.g., 30 C.F.R. § 243.3 (1994).
5. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1994).
6. 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-316o (1994).
7. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1994).
8. For a thorough discussion of the problems associated with the judicial system which ADR seeks
to address, see Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV.
L. REv. 668, 669-72 (1986). But see Kim Dayton, The Myth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in
the Federal Courts, 76 IOWA L. REv. 889, 889 (1991) (ADR "is illusory, if not an outright myth.
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administrative forums still play a substantial role in deciding disputes and refining
final agency decisions before review by the federal judiciary, some conflicts can
and are being resolved before, or as an alternative to, an administrative appeal.
A. The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act
In 1990, Congress enacted the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act
("ADRA") 9 which mandated that all federal agencies review and implement some
form of ADR in their programs.' ° In the ADRA, Congress's specific mandate to
the agencies was that each agency appoint a high-level official as the Dispute
Resolution Specialist to oversee the implementation of an ADR program." Each
agency was also required to adopt a policy that addresses the application of ADR
to case management and to "formal and informal adjudications; rulemakings;
enforcement actions; issuing and revoking licenses or permits; contract
administration; litigation brought by or against the agency; and other agency
actions."' 2
The ADRA suggested that agencies experiment with settlement
negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, fact-finding, mini-trials,
arbitration, or any combination of ADR techniques.' 3 Congress acknowledged,
however, that "you can't please all the people, all the time," and did not mandate
the use of ADR.'4 Congress likewise recognized that there are times when ADR
Effective movement of a trial docket occurs when a presiding judge does two things: (1) sets an
early trial date, and (2) adheres to the trial date if a settlement or dismissal does not occur in the
interim." (quoting Letter from Hon. Richard L. Williams to Kim Dayton (June 25, 1990))).
9. Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (1990) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-583
(1994)).
10. Id. Congress was clearly concerned about the increase in the volume and the amount of time
and resources devoted to administrative review when it passed the ADRA. See 5 U.S.C. § 571 note
(1994) (Congressional Findings). Congress found that:
(1) administrative procedure . . . is intended to offer a prompt, expert, and
inexpensive means of resolving disputes as an alternative to litigation in the
Federal courts;
(2) administrative proceedings have become increasingly formal, costly, and
lengthy resulting in unnecessary expenditures of time and in a decreased
likelihood of achieving consensual resolution of disputes;
(3) alternative means of dispute resolution have been used in the private sector
for many years and, in appropriate circumstances, have yielded decisions that
are faster, less expensive, and less contentious ....
Id.
1I. 5 U.S.C. § 571 note (1994) (Promotion of Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution).
12. Id.
13. See id. § 571(3).
14. See id. § 572(a).
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is not appropriate for the resolution of disputes. 5 It stated:
An agency shall consider not using a dispute resolution
proceeding if-
(l) a definitive or authoritative resolution of the
matter is required for precedential value, and
such a proceeding is not likely to be accepted
generally as an authoritative precedent;
(2) the matter involves or may bear upon
significant questions of Government policy that
require additional procedures before a final
resolution may be made, and such a proceeding
would not likely serve to develop a
recommended policy for the agency;
(3) maintaining established policies is of special
importance, so that variations among individual
decisions are not increased and such a
proceeding would not likely reach consistent
results among individual decisions;
(4) the matter significantly affects persons or
organizations who are not parties to the
proceeding;
(5) a full public record of the proceeding is
important, and a dispute resolution proceeding
cannot provide such a record; and
(6) the agency must maintain continuing
jurisdiction over the matter with authority to
alter the disposition of the matter in the light of
changed circumstances, and a dispute resolution
proceeding would interfere with the agency's
fulfilling that requirement. 16
To implement the ADRA, the DOI published an Interim ADR Policy
15. See id. § 572(b).
16. Id.
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("Interim Policy"). 7 The first action taken pursuant to the Interim Policy was the
appointment of the OHA Director as the Department's Dispute Resolution
Specialist.'" In that capacity, the OHA Director facilitates intra-DOI coordination
and communication; ensures consistent and quality training; and establishes
minimum qualifications for mediators, arbitrators, and employees with ADR
responsibilities.' 9 Despite OHA being the focal point for ADR activity, the DOI's
Interim Policy encourages decentralized decisionmaking on "how" and "when"
to propose the use of ADR.2°
The Interim Policy also created the Interior Dispute Resolution Council
("IDRC"). 2 ' This body is composed of the Assistant Secretaries, the Solicitor, the
Director of the Office of Regulatory Affairs, or their designees, and is chaired by
the Dispute Resolution Specialist.22 The IDRC is charged with monitoring DOI's
use of ADR and Negotiated Rulemaking.23
To assure that the goals of the ADRA are implemented in each of the
Department's Bureaus, the Interim Policy mandates that each Bureau Head
appoint a Bureau Dispute Resolution Specialist ("BDRS").24 Each BDRS receives
preliminary training in the use of ADR consensus-building techniques, conflict
resolution, and program design.25 Within sixty days of completion of this
training, each BDRS develops its Bureau's ADR Plan ("ADRP") and submits it
to the Bureau's respective Assistant Secretary.26 , Specifically, the Interim Policy
requires each ADRP to "include at least one category of disputes amenable to
ADR methods. 27  The Interim Policy also encourages Bureaus to select a
category of disputes central to the DOI's mission for their ADR pilot initiatives2 .
and to include a program to implement ADR to address such disputes.2 9 Finally,
the Interim Policy requires that each ADRP contain goals, objectives, timetables,
implementation strategy, monitoring criteria, and evaluation methodology.30 To
ensure consistency, Bureaus must submit their ADRPs to the IDRC for review
17. Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), 59 Fed. Reg. 30,368 (1994).
18. Id. at 30,369.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 30,370.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. The particular "category of disputes" was to be selected after the Bureau examined its
"inventory" of disputes both within and outside the Bureau. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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prior to approval by the Assistant Secretary.3 The IDRC also monitors the
ADRPs' performance, and evaluates each ADRP at the end of the two-year
Interim Policy phase and reports the results to the Secretary.3 2
This review of the recent statutory history, in addition to the DOI's
historic commitment to solving disputes outside of the federal courts, makes it
clear that ADR is here to stay as an additional tool for resolving conflicts. As
demonstrated below, agencies have been creative in adopting various forms of
ADR in an attempt to work out complex, seemingly unresolvable conflicts.
B. Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution
ADR is "an inclusive term used to describe a wide variety of problem
solving processes. 33 Some of these methods are new to the dispute resolution
process, while others are variations of techniques the DOI has used for over one
hundred years.34 A review of the characteristics of each of these methods
provides a means for evaluating their usefulness in NRDA conflict resolution.
1. Arbitration
Arbitration is "[a] process, quasi-judicial in nature, whereby a dispute is
submitted to an impartial and neutral third party who considers the facts and
merits of a case and decides the matter."35 Arbitration can be either mandated by
a court or contract or entered into voluntarily, and the arbitrator's decision is
normally binding. 36 This means the parties have agreed to accept the settlement
as final.37 An arbitration decision may only be appealed on very limited grounds,
such as fraud or evidence of concealed partiality.3 Thus, arbitration is more final
than administrative or court decisions, which may be appealed on a wide variety
of reasons related to interpretation of law, evidence, or facts. Given the final
nature of an arbitration decision, the ADRA mandates that any arbitration decision
may be vacated by an agency head within a thirty-day period after the decision
3 1. Id. The IDRC recommends changes and improvements before the ADRP is submitted to the
Assistant Secretary. Id.
32. Id. at 30,370-71.
33. Id. at 30,371 app. I. See infra notes 35-127 and accompanying text.
34. The Interim Policy defines some of these methods. Id. at 30,371-72. See also supra notes 2-7
and accompanying text.
35. 59 Fed. Reg. 30,371.
36. Philip J. Harter, Points on a Continuum: Dispute Resolution Proceduresand the Administrative
Proces, in MARGUERrrE S. MILLHAUSER Er AL., ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., SOURCEBOOK:
FEDERAL AGENCY USE OF ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF DISPUTE RESOLUHON 309, 311 (Office of the Chairman
1987) [hereinafter ADR SOURCEBOOK].
37. Id.
38. U.S. Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994). See also Harter, supra note 36, at 313 & n.56.
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is served on the agency.39
The advantages of arbitration are: (1) the parties may usually choose, or
negotiate over the choice of, the arbitrator;4" (2) the parties can agree to the
ground rules of the proceeding4 and the type of evidence that will be excluded
from the proceeding;42 and (3) the process is normally confidential and only the
parties may learn the final results.43 Arbitration is one of the most widely used
forms of non-litigious dispute resolution in the United States44 and is suitable for
any dispute in which the parties are willing to be bound by the decision and to
forego appellate procedures.45 It is generally faster and less expensive than court
litigation.46 Arbitration is useful in complex multi-party disputes, in part, because
the process of preparing for arbitration forces parties to narrow the issues under
dispute.47 However, arbitration is not appropriate when: (1) an authoritative
interpretation of law or regulation is needed; (2) the maintenance of consistent
established government policy is of special importance; (3) the dispute would
significantly affect persons not parties to the proceeding; or (4) a public record
of the proceeding is important.48
39. 5 U.S.C. § 580(b).
40. See, e.g., id. § 577(a). See also Roger J. Patterson, Dispute Resolution in a World of
Alternatives, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 591, 592-93 (1988); Harter, supra note 36, at 312-13.
41. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 579(c)(2), (e)(1); Patterson, supra note 40, at 593; Harter, supra note 36,
at 312-13.
42. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 579(c)(1); Patterson, supra note 40, at 593; Harter, supra note 36, at 312-
13.
43. Harter, supra note 36, at 340; Kirby Behre, Arbitration: A Permissible or Desirable Method
for Resolving Disputes Involving FederalAcquisition andAssistance Contracts?, 16 PUB. CONT. L.J.
66, 71 (1986).
44. Patterson, supra note 40, at 592. See also Harter, supra note 36, at 310; Timothy S. Hardy
& R. Mason Cargill, Resolving Government Contract Disputes: Why Not Arbitrate?, 34 FED. B.J.
1, 8 (1975).
45. Behre, supra note 43, at 70.
46. See Hardy & Cargill, supra note 44, at 9; Patterson, supra note 40, at 599-600; Behre, supra
note 43, at 70-71.
47. Patterson, supra note 40, at 600. See, e.g., Richard H. Robinson, ADR in Enforcement Actions
at the U.S. EnvironmentalProtectionAgency, in CONTAINING LEGAL COSTS: ADR STRATEGIES FOR
CORPORATIONS, LAW FIRMS, AND GOVERNMENT 297, 298-99 (1988). For example, the EPA uses
arbitration to resolve disputes involving polluted sites governed by the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
9601-9675 (1994). Harter, supra note 36, at 609-14; U.S. EPA, Guidance on the Use ofAlternative
Dispute Resolution in EPA EnforcementCases, in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 36, at 737, 762-63.
Under CERCLA, arbitration may be used to settle federal claims where total response costs do not
exceed $500,000. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(h)(2). See also Harter, supra note 36, at 609-14.
48. See U.S. EPA, supra note 47, at 762-63; Harter, supra note 36, at 315-16; Edwards, supra note
8, at 674 & n.18.
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2. Conciliation
Conciliation is a process that brings a neutral third party into the
negotiation process to assist in establishing "trust and openness between the
parties to a dispute." '49 The conciliator acts as a go-between, communicating each
side's position to the other and relaying settlement options.5" Thus, conciliation
is appropriate where parties to a dispute are "unable, unwilling, or unprepared to
come to the table to negotiate their differences."'" A conciliator may also advise
the parties about the consequences of discovery and other litigation procedures.52
3. Dispute Review Board
A Dispute Review Board ("Board") is a panel, usually composed of three
independent members, designed to provide prompt recommendations to assist in
the resolution of project disputes.5 3 This type of ADR mechanism works to
assure that interruptions of the project are prevented and to resolve small disputes
early on before they escalate and end up in litigation.54 The Board's decisions are
non-binding55 and may be accepted or rejected by the parties or used as a basis
for further negotiation.56 Although the Board visits the project site, the number
of visits depends on the size of the project57 and the agreement of the parties.58
The costs of the Board are generally apportioned between the parties.59 In a
sense, this constitutes ongoing arbitration between the parties, but with the distinct
advantages of being swift and having disputes resolved by parties familiar with
the individual project and the concerns of all parties.
4. Early Neutral Evaluation
Early neutral evaluation ("ENE") is a procedure whereby a neutral third
party meets with disputants and reviews summaries of their cases to evaluate their
49. 59 Fed. Reg. 30,371.
50. National Inst. for Dispute Resolution, Paths To Justice: Major Public Policy Issues of Dispute
Resolution, in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 36, at 5, 44-45.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 44.
53. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Department of the Army, Implementation of Alternative
Contract Disputes Resolution Procedure, in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 36, at 721, 725,26.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 723, 725.
56. Id. at 724, 728.
57. Id. at 721.
58. Id at 729.
59. See e.g., id. at 730.
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relative strengths and weaknesses.6" The neutral party is "typically a locally
respected attorney with expertise in the principal subject area of the dispute."6
The neutral party may ask questions during the evaluation session and ultimately
offer his assessments of each party's position and the likely outcome of the case
should it proceed to litigation.62 The benefit of ENE is that it assists the parties
to find common ground and helps each side understand the other's perspective.
The ideal outcome of this procedure is for the neutral party to mediate settlement
discussions between the parties.63 The recommendations of the neutral party are
non-binding64 but offer participants the opportunity to receive an early and
realistic evaluation of their case before investing substantial amounts of time and
money in litigation."
5. Facilitation
Facilitation is a process which:
[I]nvolves the assistance of a third party who is impartial toward
the issues under discussion and who works with all participants
in a whole group session providing procedural directions on how
the group can effectively move through the problem-solving steps
of the meeting and arrive at a jointly agreed upon goal.66
A facilitator does not focus on the substance of the issues under discussion.67
Instead, she acts as a "neutral process expert" to help the parties focus on the
process of resolving complex issues in order to improve their chances of reaching
61an agreement.
6. Fact-Finding
Fact-finding uses "neutrals acceptable to all parties to determine disputed
60. Dayton, supra note 8, at 912-13. ENE is used by the U.S. District Courts for the Northern
District of California and the District of Columbia. Id. at 912 & n.133. See also Patterson, supra
note 40, at 598.
61. Dayton, supra note 8, at 912-13.
62. Id. at 913.
63. In addition to promoting settlement, ENE assists the parties in "preparing stipulations of fact,
drafting discovery plans, and identifying the issues." Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 914; Patterson, supra note 40, at 598.
66. 59 Fed. Reg. 30,371. •
67. National Inst. for Dispute Resolution, supra note 50, at 45.
68. Id
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facts." '69 The neutral (or neutrals, as the case may be) usually has expertise in the
subject matter of the dispute.7" Parties typically offer an informal presentation of
their case,7 but the neutral may conduct further research on the issues in
dispute. The neutral provides an advisory opinion on the disputed issues73
which the parties can then use as a basis for further negotiation.74 Fact-finding
may be particularly useful where disagreements about the need for, or meaning
of, data are impeding resolution of a dispute because the process seeks to resolve
disputed facts or highly technical issues which are better addressed by experts.75
7. Mediation
Mediation is one of the most informal ADR procedures, involving the
intervention of an impartial and neutral third party into a dispute.76 Unlike an
arbitrator, the mediator has no decisionmaking authority but assists the parties
procedurally to reach a voluntary settlement of the dispute.77 Thus, the mediator
does not issue a binding decision.7" Mediation sessions are private and
confidential.79 Parties are governed by the rules of procedure and conduct which
they have agreed upon in advance."0 If any party is unhappy with the outcome,
they may opt not to draft a final settlement agreement.8 ' Mediation is useful
where a negotiated settlement is likely, 2 where the parties are likely to have
dealings in the future, 3 and where the parties need a process to mitigate emotions
impeding communication.84
The success of mediation in multi-party disputes is an example of the
69. 59 Fed. Reg. 30,371. See also U.S. EPA, supra note 47, at 743.
70. U.S. EPA, supra note 47, at 743.
71. 59 Fed. Reg. 30,371. See also National Inst. for Dispute Resolution, supra note 50, at 45.
72. National Inst. for Dispute Resolution, supra note 50, at 45.
73. 59 Fed. Reg. 30,371; U.S. EPA, supra note 47, at 743.
74. 59 Fed. Reg. 30,371; National Inst. for Dispute Resolution, supra note 50, at 45. The neutral's
decision can be binding or non-binding according to the wishes of the parties. U.S. EPA, supra
note 47, at 743.
75. 59 Fed. Reg. 30,371.
76. John W. Cooley, Arbitration vs. Mediation-Explainingthe Differences,69 JUDICATURE 263,266
(1986); Patterson, supra note 40, at 594.
77. Cooley, supra note 76, at 263.
78. Patterson, supra note 40, at 594.
79. Cooley, supra note 76, at 267. See also Barbara A. Phillips & Anthony C. Piazza, The Role
of Mediation in Public Interest Disputes, 34 HASTINGs L.J. 1231, 1234 (1983).
80. Phillips & Piazza, supra note 79, at 1234-36.
81. Cooley, supra note 76, at 267; U.S. EPA, supra note 47, at 742.
82. National Inst. for Dispute Resolution, supra note 50, at 14; Cooley, supra note 76, at 264.
83. National Inst. for Dispute Resolution, supra note 50, at 14; Cooley, supra note 76, at 264.
84. Phillips & Piazza, supra note 79, at 1234; National Inst. for Dispute Resolution, supra note 50,
at 14; Cooley, supra note 76, at 269. This involves "separat[ing] the people from the problem."
Cooley, supra note 76, at 267 n.36.
[Vol. 20:001
THE USE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
adaptability of the process.8 5 Mediation is often better equipped to resolve
disputes than traditional litigation because the process allows for more candid
discussion of parties' interests and substantially more flexibility and creativity. 6
The primary reason why it is such a flexible process is that the parties develop
decisionmaking procedures tailored to the needs of the specific dispute." The
parties also choose the neutral.88 Because mediators have different styles, levels
of experience, and backgrounds, the disputants can select a neutral based upon the
intricacies of the issue, giving the process additional flexibility as compared with
traditional adversarial processes.8 9
8. Mini-Trial
A mini-trial is "a structured settlement process in which the disputants
agree on a procedure for presenting their cases in highly abbreviated versions
(usually no more than a few hours or a few days) to [each party's] senior
[decisionmaking officials]."9 Thus, mini-trials allow senior officials to assess
firsthand the relative strengths or weaknesses of their cases, and can serve as a
basis for more successful negotiations.9 Often, a neutral will assist the senior
officials or preside over the hearing.92 The neutral may also subsequently mediate
the dispute or give his opinion on the likely outcome of litigation.93 Like
mediation, the mini-trial is voluntary and non-binding, and, like arbitration, the
parties vigorously present their positions.94 Given the need to invest substantial
resources in attorneys, senior officials, witnesses, and a neutral party, the mini-
trial is only appropriate for major disputes that could only otherwise be resolved
85. For three case studies of multi-party mediation, see Lawrence Susskind & Connie Ozawa,
Mediated Negotiation in the Public Sector, 27 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 255-79 (1983). See also
Phillips & Piazza, supra note 79, at 1238-41.
86. Phillips & Piazza, supra note 79, at 1234-36; Patterson, supra note 40, at 594.
87. Phillips & Piazza, supra note 79, at 1234-36; Patterson, supra note 40, at 594.
88. Phillips & Piazza, supra note 79, at 1234-36; Patterson, supra note 40, at 594.
89. Patterson, supra note 40, at 595. The desirable background and experience of a mediator
depends on the nature of the dispute and the parties' perception of the skills necessary to resolve
the dispute. Id.
90. 59 Fed. Reg. 30,371. See also Patterson, supra note 40, at 595. Participating officials must
have the authority to enter into a binding settlement agreement. Id.; LESTER EDELMAN ET AL., U.S.
ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, PAMPHLET-89-ADR-P-I, THE MINI-TRIAL 1 (1989) [hereinafter THE MINI-
TRIAL].
91. 59 Fed. Reg. 30,371; THE MINI-TRIAL, supra note 90, at 3; Patterson, supra note 40, at 595.
92. 59 Fed. Reg. 30,371; THE MINI-TRIAL, supra note 90, at 2; Patterson, supra note 40, at 595-96.
93. 59 Fed. Reg. 30,371; THE MINI-TRIAL, supra note 90, at 2.
94. Patterson, supra note 40, at 595; THE MINI-TRIAL, supra note 90, at 2.
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by long, complex, and costly litigation." However, even if the size and
complexity of the dispute justifies a mini-trial, it should be used only in disputes
regarding the facts of the case, not about "what the law means."96
9. Partnering
Partnering is a process unlike other forms of ADR because it is
specifically designed to prevent disputes from developing in the first instance.97
Partnering involves a series of meetings of the relevant parties in a "partnering
workshop," usually in a retreat-type setting, where the parties get to know each
other.9" With the help of a neutral, the parties proceed through team-building
exercises and discussions regarding the project, costs, potential problems, etc.99
The result of the meetings is a "Partnering Charter" which outlines the future
relationship between the parties, responses to disputes, and the project goals.00
The Partnering Charter should also include ADR methods should later disputes
arise.'O1 The Partnering Charter is supplemental to other contracts and agreements
that may have been signed by the parties. However, the Partnering Charter does
not create any legally enforceable rights.'0 2 Partnering allows parties involved in
major projects to establish a cooperative, team relationship based on open
communication, shared risks and rewards, and collaborative decisionmaking. °3
Partnering, like the Dispute Review Board, is used by the construction industry
as a way to avoid problems that might otherwise disrupt a large construction
venture and create additional project costs for all parties.0 4
10. Private Judging
Private judging is similar to arbitration because parties refer their dispute
to a neutral third party who renders a binding decision.'0 5 However, in private
95. Patterson, supra note 40, at 596; THE MINI-TRIAL, supra note 90, at 7-8. The U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers ("Corps") has successfully used mini-trials to resolve construction contract disputes
involving millions of dollars. THE MINI-TRIAL, supra note 90, at 7-8.
96. THE MINI-TRIAL, supra note 90, at 10. See also Patterson, supra note 40, at 596.
97. LESTER EDELMAN E7 AL., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, PAMPHLET-91-ADR-P-4, PARTNERING 1
(1991) [hereinafter PARTNERING].
98. Id. at 2-3, 18-19.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 3, 19-20. Common project goals are quality, safety, timeliness, and cost-effectiveness.
Id.
101. Id. at 8.
102. Id. at 1.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1-2. The Corps has used the partnering concept with both its construction contractors
and its suppliers. Id. at 7-15.
105. Patterson, supra note 40, at 597.
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judging, the parties decide "how" and "when" to utilize private judging after a
dispute has arisen, whereas parties normally elect to use arbitration at the time of
contract before the dispute arises. °6 Private judging may speed the completion
of civil trials by permitting litigants to hire their own private judge to hear and
decide all or a portion of their case." 7 In California, private judging is used by
parties who do not wish to wait years for their cases to be heard by overburdened
civil trial courts.0 8 Generally, litigants may choose an attorney or retired judge0 9 ,
to preside over a "trial" and render a decision just as a court would."' This
decision may be appealable through the normal state court appellate system."'
11. Settlement Negotiation
Settlement negotiation is a process in which the parties hold discussions
in an attempt to settle on a compromise agreement of the dispute, some portion
of it, or a procedural point.' 2  Agencies use settlement negotiation as a
"procedure[] and process[] for settling matters that would otherwise be resolved
by more formal means.""'3 Settlement negotiation can be voluntary on the part
of the parties, before or after an action is filed, but is sometimes required by court
rules as a prerequisite to an adjudicative procedure."4  Because agencies'
settlement agreements may be subject to multiple layers of review and approval,
as many agency decisionmakers as possible should be included in the
negotiations. 115
12. Settlement Conference
A settlement conference is an attempt by the court in which a lawsuit is
filed to settle the suit before a trial or hearing." 6  Judges often schedule
settlement conferences at the pre-trial conference stage under Rule 16 of the
106. Id.
107. Id. at 597, 601.
108. Id. at 597.
109. In complex cases, parties may wish to select a private judge with expertise in the disputed
area. Id. at 600.
110. Id. California courts offer referral to a private judge who will hear the case, and his decision
becomes that of the court. Id. at 597.
III. Id. However, the decision is not subject to trial de novo. Id.
112. See generally 59 Fed. Reg. 30,372; Charles Pou, Jr., Federal Agency Use of "ADR": The
Experience to Date, in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 36, at 101, 118.
113. Pou, supra note 112, at 118.
114. National Inst. for Dispute Resolution, supra note 50, at 45.
115. Pou, supra note 112, at 116.
116. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory
Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 490-93 (1985).
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 16(a)(5) specifically gives the judge
discretionary authority to direct the parties to appear before the court at a pre-trial
conference to "facilitate settlement of the case.""' 7 The settlement conference is
sometimes presided over by the judge to whom the case is assigned for hearing
but may also be referred to another judge, magistrate, or other court officer." 8
While style and procedure will vary widely with the forum and presiding
official," 9 the judge will hear each side's respective positions and, depending on
the judge, may offer his opinion of the parties' positions. 20 The judge may then
attempt to convince each side to settle the dispute and thus help to "broker" a
settlement. 121
13. Summary Jury Trial
A summary jury trial is a process, either court-mandated or voluntary, in
which parties present abbreviated versions of their cases to a "jury," which
renders a non-binding, advisory verdict. 22 The jury may then discuss the case's
strengths and weaknesses with the parties and their counsel. 23 The parties may
enter into a settlement agreement based on the advisory verdict, use the verdict
as the basis for further negotiation, or proceed to litigation.' 24 The summary jury
trial process generally lasts less than one day and is most appropriate in cases
where the outcome of factual disputes does not hinge on witness credibility as
witnesses usually are not presented. 25 This technique was developed for use in
federal district courts2 6 and authorized by Congress in the Civil Justice Reform
Act of 1990.127
As the preceding inventory indicates, numerous ADR techniques exist for
resolving disputes of any size, shape, or form. Additionally, there are infinite
variations and combinations of these techniques that can be tailored for a
particular dispute or set of disputes. With these ADR methods in mind, the
following section analyzes their application to Natural Resource Damage
Assessments.
117. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5). See also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 116, at 491-92.
118. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 116, at 491-92.
119. For a good discussion of the role of judges in settlement conferences, see id. at 494-98.
120. Id. at 510-11.
121. Id. at 506, 510-11.
122. Patterson, supra note 40, at 596; Dayton, supra note 8, at 905-07.
123. Dayton, supra note 8, at 907 & n.89.
124. Patterson, supra note 40, at 596.
125. Id.; Dayton, supra note 8, at 908.
126. Patterson, supra note 40, at 596 & n.27; Dayton, supra note 8, at 905-07.
127. 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6)(B) (1994).
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II. NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS
A new era of increased environmental awareness and activism
commenced when Congress promulgated the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969 ("NEPA"). 28  Environmental disasters, such as the Love Canal toxic
waste dump, eventually led to promulgation of specific environmental statutes.'2 9
One of these statutes, CERCLA, 13° was enacted "to address the threat to human
health and the environment of abandoned hazardous waste sites." '31 Although
CERCLA has primarily been invoked to clean up abandoned waste sites, it also
authorizes public trustees'32 to recover for injury to, loss of, or destruction of
natural resources.'33  CERCLA also specifically requires that the President
promulgate regulations for the assessment of damages for the injury to, loss of,
128. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4370d (1994). "The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's
activity on the interrelations of all components of the natural environment ... declares that it is the
continuing policy .. .to use all practicable means and measures ... to create and maintain
conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony. ... Id. § 4331(a).
129. Sarah L. Inderbitzin, Taking the Burden Off the Buyer: A Survey of Hazardous Waste
Disclosure Statutes, 1 ENVTL. LAW. 513, 517 (1995).
130. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.
131. Inderbitzin, supra note 129, at 517. See also Pilar Okun, The Revised Natural Resource
Damage AssessmentRule: Computation for Compensation and Restoration, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 959
(1992) (discussing DOI's revisions to CERCLA's natural resource damage rules).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C). Unlike the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), which also authorizes the
recovery of NRDs, CERCLA specifically authorizes Indian tribes to act as trustees, in addition to
federal and state governments. Id. § 9607(f)(1). See also infra note 133.
133. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C). However, it was not until 1989, with the highly publicized
environmental catastrophe which resulted from the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound,
that the public became aware of the need to restore damaged or destroyed natural resources. Terry
Fox, Natural Resource Damages: The New Frontier of Environmental Litigation, 34 S. TEX. L.J.
521, 521-22 (1993). Since that time, trustees have increased efforts to recover for injuries to natural
resources. Id. at 522-23. See also Grayson R. Cecil & Nancy Foster, Natural Resource Injury at
OilSpills: A NewApproach, 45 BAYLOR L. REv. 423 (1993) (recommending new approach to natural
resource damage assessment in light of Exxon Valdez oil spill). The Department of Justice has seen
an increase in suits seeking natural resource damages since the Exxon Valdez spill. Fox, supra, at
538 n.113.
In response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill, Congress enacted the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
("OPA") with comprehensive natural resource damage recovery provisions. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-
2761 (1994). Like CERCLA, OPA requires promulgation of NRDA regulations. The National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ("NOAA") was delegated responsibility for the
promulgation of those regulations and has published proposed rules. Id. § 2706(e)(1); Natural
Resource Damage Assessments, 60 Fed. Reg. 39,804 (1995).
Prior to the Exxon Valdez oil spill and enactment of the OPA, amendments to the CWA
gave federal and state governments the authority to recover damages for injuries to natural
resources. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(4) (1994). Trustees could recover for discharges of oil and
hazardous substances "into or upon the navigable waters of the United States." Id. § 1321 (b)(1).
Thus, unlike CERCLA, the CWA specifically applies to releases of oil.
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or destruction of natural resources.' 34 Former President Ronald Reagan delegated
that responsibility to the DOI.'35
In 1986, the DOI issued rules for assessing natural resource damages.
136
Trustees are not required to follow the DOI's rules, but CERCLA provides that
any assessment made under those rules benefits from a rebuttable presumption
that the assessment is accurate.'37 Accordingly, it is in the trustee's best interest
to conduct assessments pursuant to DOI rules.
The 1986 DOI NRDA rules were challenged in Ohio v. Department of the
Interior.' That decision invalidated portions of the DOI's rules as: (1) contrary
to congressional intent that the primary measure of natural resource damages
should be restoration costs,'39 and (2) contrary to congressional intent that trustees
receive full compensation for damages to natural resources. 4  The court
remanded the rules to the DOI and directed the Department to revise the
regulations consistent with its decision.' 4' On March 25, 1994, the DOI issued
its final revised rules which addressed all but one aspect of the Ohio decision.' 42
The reasons for settlement in the NRDA context are not complex. From
the potentially responsible parties' ("PRPs") perspective, they have an incentive
to negotiate because the trustees have substantial discretion in selecting the
134. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c).
135. Executive Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (1987).
136. 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.10-.93 (1994).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(C).
138. 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
139. Id. at 456. DOI's rule limited trustee damage recoveries to the "lesser of' restoration or
replacement costs or the diminution of use value of the injured resource. 43 C.F.R. § 11.35.
140. Ohio, 880 F.2d at 462-63. The 1986 rule set up a hierarchy of valuation methodology which
almost exclusively relied on the market value of the resource. 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c)(1). Trustees
could select an alternative value only if the market value methods were impossible. Id. § 11.83(d).
Problems with this method are that, frequently, there is no "market" value for a resource, and,
notwithstanding the existence of a market value, intangible values are not captured therein.
Another restriction in the rule which severely limited the ability of trustees to recover
"non-use value" damages was also invalidated. Non-use values include: (1) "option value," the
value of knowing that one has the option to use a resource, (2) "existence value," knowing the
resource exists whether one intends to use it or not, and (3) "bequest value," the value of the
resource to future generations. See Fox, supra note 133, at 545-47. See also Rhoda L. White,
Natural Resource Damages: Trusting the Trustees, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 407, 418-19 (1990)
(discussing valuation of natural resources).
141. Ohio, 880 F.2d at 481.
142. 59 Fed. Reg. 14,261 (1994). The revised final rule did not address the assessmentof lost non-
use values. See supra note 140. The revised rules have also been challenged in Chamber of
Commerce v. United States Dep't of the Interior, No. 94-1462 (D.D.C. filed June 21, 1994). The
consolidated case involves actions by numerous industry representatives and one state. Id. Several
states have intervened on behalf of the United States. Id. Two primary issues are: (1) whether the
DOI gave the trustees too much discretion and flexibility to select the appropriate alternative for
purposes of calculating damages, and (2) whether the level of guidance provided by the rules in
selecting a method is consistent with CERCLA. Id.
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appropriate remedy and calculating costs'43 which form the basic measure of
damages.' The trustees may also collect damages to recover the use and non-
use values lost to the public until the restoration is complete.'45 Finally, the
responsible parties are liable for the reasonable costs of the trustees' assessment. 146
Combined, the responsible parties face potentially large liability. Moreover, while
the trustees conduct their studies and until the resource is restored, the damages
continue to increase.
The trustees' incentives to negotiate are different but equally
unambiguous. The primary goal of the NRDA process is to restore the integrity
of the resource. 147 Statutes with NRDA provisions, however, do not make funds
available for restoration. 148  Thus, until the parties settle or a court enters an
award for damages, injury to the resource and the broader ecosystem may
continue, and the trustees' ability to address natural resource damages will be
lessened as resources are devoted to lingering cases. 149  The trustees' incentive
is clear: restore, remediate, or replace the resource as quickly as possible while
avoiding protracted litigation.
The DOI's NRDA rules create incentives which encourage negotiation
and settlement. This, in addition to the trustees' and PRPs' shared goals of
generating a fast and efficient remedy, makes the question not whether negotiating
is a good idea, but rather "when" and "how" best to negotiate.
A. NRDA Regulations
The DOI's NRDA regulations set out a four-phase administrative process
for conducting NRDAs. Although ADR has frequently been used during these
processes, the DOI does not explicitly incorporate ADR procedures into its
rules.150 However, the DOI has encouraged the use of ADR in its regulations 5'
143. See supra notes 132-40 and accompanying text.
144. Although the preferred remedy is restoration, unless the costs are completely disproportionate
to the value of the resource, the Department has substantial discretion over the choice of valuation
methodology. Ohio, 880 F.2d at 444, 459. The valuation methodology, thus, can become the
predicate for the damages. See Okun, supra note 131, at 970-71.
145. See supra note 140.
146. 43 C.F.R. § 11.91(a).
147. Ohio, 880 F.2d at 444.
148. For example, CERCLA's Superfund provision does not apply to natural resource restoration.
See 42 U.S.C. § 9611.
149. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. Under budget-constrained circumstances, even
with everything else remaining constant, it is axiomatic that an agency's carrying capacity
diminishes as greater demands are placed on its resources.
150. Only NOAA has proposed regulations that explicitly encourage settlement among the parties
involved in NRDAs. 60 Fed. Reg. 39,828. See also id. at 39,809, 39,820; Natural Resource
Damage Assessments Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 59 Fed. Reg. 1162 (1994). Trustees and
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through "negotiated resolutions.' 15 2 Accordingly, as will be discussed below, the
use of ADR is proper in each phase of an NRDA under DOI rules.
1. Preassessment Phase
The first phase under the DOI's NRDA rules is called the Preassessment
Phase.' "53 This phase covers activities that precede the actual assessment. 5 4 As
a preliminary matter, after a natural resource trustee is notified of the discharge
or release, she should assist in identifying other trustees.' 55 Once trustees are
identified, they must determine whether further assessment activities are
warranted, including appraising whether injuries have occurred to natural
resources.' Trustees must base their determination on various criteria and
conditions outlined in the DOI's NRDA regulations.' 57  The trustees'
determination is documented in the Preassessment Screen Determination.'
Because preliminary assessment activities are expensive and may be
duplicative in the case of numerous trustees, trustees should coordinate their
assessment efforts at this earliest phase.'59 To this end, NOAA has published a
Draft Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") for trustees with its proposed
NRDA rules. 6 ' The Draft MOU outlines, among other things, the trustees' duties
and responsibilities, the method of decisionmaking and dispute resolution, and the
handling and disposition of damages recovered.' 6 ' At this juncture, it has proven
responsible parties "may settle a claim for natural resource damages at any time" following a
discharge. 60 Fed. Reg. 39,828.
151. Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 59 Fed. Reg. 52,749, 52,753 (1994).
152. Id. at 52,753.
153. Id. at 52,750; 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.20-.25.
154. 59 Fed. Reg. 52,750; 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.20-.25.
155. 43 C.F.R. § 11.20(c).
156. Id. § 11.22.
157. Id. § 11.23. The DOI requires trustees to conduct a preassessment screen to determine that
all of the following criteria are met before beginning formal assessment efforts: (1) a discharge has
occurred; (2) natural resources have been or are likely to be injured; (3) the quantity and
concentration of the discharge is sufficient to cause injury to the natural resources; (4) there is
sufficient data, necessary to pursue an NRDA, readily available or obtainable at a reasonable cost;
and (5) response actions undertaken in accordance with the National Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R.
Part 300, do not or will not remedy the injury to natural resources. 43 C.F.R. § 11.23(e)(1)-(5).
158. 43 C.F.R. § 11.23(c). The Preassessment Screen Determination includes information on the
site and on the discharge or release, damages excluded from liability under CERCLA or the CWA,
a preliminary determination of exposure pathways, exposed areas, estimates of concentrations of the
oil or hazardous substance, and potentially affected resources. Id. §§ 11.24, 11.25.
159. Cecil & Foster, supra note 133, at 425-26. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.32(a)(1) (cotrustee
coordination for Planning Phase).
160. 57 Fed. Reg. 8984 (1992).
161. Id. at 8985.
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effective to include the PRPs in any cooperative agreement. 162
Early inclusion of PRPs, especially if initiated by a neutral, 63 sends a
clear message to the PRPs that the trustees seek PRP involvement and a non-
adversarial process. 164 Depending on the circumstances of the case, the neutral
can help the parties memorialize the level of collaboration through a consent
agreement."' Because of the great potential for breakdown in communication 
66
and the need for logistical coordination, 167 both the trustees and the PRPs can
benefit from the assistance of the neutral. The potential beneficial results of such
cooperative efforts are: (1) it saves money and prevents duplicative studies
performed by trustees and PRPs; 16 1 (2) settlement, unlike litigation, focuses the
parties on the goal of restoration; 69 and (3) it fosters trust and confidence
between the parties when data and calculations of values are shared. 7' Therefore,
162. Cecil & Foster, supra note 133, at 425. In the case of the Megaborg spill off the Texas coast,
joint studies performed by the trustees and PRPs resulted in an agreement as to how to proceed with
further studies within three days of the spill. Id. See also infra notes 273-93 and accompanying
text.
163. The neutral need not be a private nor professional dispute resolution specialist if a non-trustee
agency individual with ADR experience is available to make initial contact with the PRPs.
164. For example, the EPA's guidelines on the use of ADR recommend early intervention. U.S.
EPA, supra note 47, at 744.
165. See Cecil & Foster, supra note 133, at 432-33.
166. See generally Thomas L. Eggert & Kathleen A. Chorostecki, Rusty Trustees and the Lost Pots
of Gold: Natural Resource Damage Trustee Coordination Under the Oil Pollution Act, 45 BAYLOR
L. REV. 291, 304-12 (1993).
167. See Endispute, Inc., Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Work: A Guide for Practicing
Lawyers, in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 36, at 53, 65-66.
168. Trustees and PRPs frequently perform duplicative studies. Richard C. Paddock, How Much
Is a River Worth? Assessing Damage in the Dausmuir Spill, CAL. LAW., Aug. 14, 1994, at 33
(Southern Pacific, state, and federal biologists conducted independent, multi-million dollar studies
of injuries to river due to release of 19,000 gallons of weed killer). See also infra notes 272-92 and
accompanying text.
169. Cecil & Foster, supra note 133, at 434.
170. Id. at 425-30. Inclusion of the PRPs at the earliest levels of decisionmaking enhances trust
which is critical to collaborative decisionmaking. See Endispute, supra note 167. PRPs' differing
interests lead them to characterize natural resource injury differently even though they may agree
on the quantitative harm. Raymond J. Kopp & V. Kerry Smith, Benefit Estimation Goes to Court:
The Case ofNaturalResourceDamageAssessments,8 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 593,600 (1989).
Without input from all of the parties, including the trustees, the preassessment is unlikely to address
the parties' broad range of interests. Thus, if a party to a dispute feels left out of the
decisionmaking process, it has a reason to try to disrupt the decision and any subsequent
collaborative efforts that build upon the earlier determination. LAWRENCE E. SUSSKIND ET AL.,
ENViRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT PROJECT, MASSACHUSETTS INST. OF TECHNOLOGY, RESOLVING
ENVIRONMENTAL DIsPurls: APPROACHES TO NTERVENTION, NEGOTIATION, AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 77
(1978). Moreover, the PRPs frequently have special knowledge of the site or resource which may
be useful in making the initial NRDA determination. Early inclusion of PRPs may therefore
increase the speed of the preassessment determination and reduce its cost.
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although the rules do not require PRP notification until the second phase, 7' the
trustees should notify the PRPs and include them in joint Preassessment Phase
activities whenever practicable and possible.
A facilitator or mediator at the Preassessment Phase could serve at least
three useful functions: (1) identifying and contacting responsible parties,
including public entities;'72 (2) explaining the trustees' intent to adopt a
cooperative approach;' 73 and (3) assisting the parties in negotiating a limited
consent agreement concerning the preparation of the preassessment screen and the
allocation of costs. 174 To the extent that an agency presently undertakes these
actions, the lead trustee would perform these functions.'75
2. Assessment Plan Phase
The second phase of the assessment process is the Assessment Plan
Phase.176 This phase explicitly requires coordination among trustees, 77 selection
of a "lead authorized official,', 78 and identification and notification of PRPs. 179
The lead authorized official, designated by mutual agreement of all trustees, acts
as the "final arbitrator of disputes if consensus cannot be reached [on] .. .any
...aspect of the Assessment Plan."' 80 Trustees must then develop a written
Assessment Plan describing the procedures that will be used to determine the
injuries and damages. 8' The Assessment Plan must select either a type A
assessment which "provide[s] standard methodologies for conducting simplified"
NRDAs8 2 or a type B assessment which "provide[s] alternative methodologies for
conducting [NRDAs] in individual cases."' 83 The lead authorized official has
171. 43 C.F.R. § l1.32(a)(2)(iii).
172. Bruce C. French, More Effective Citizen Participation in Environmental Decisionmaking, 24
U. TOL. L. REV. 389, 403 (1993). A third party might be able to "ferret-out" PRPs and others who
should be involved in negotiations, including those with no direct legal stake, such as locally
impacted residents and industries.
173. DAVID M PRITZKER & DMOnH S. DALTON, AMMhIRATIVE CONF CE OF THE U.S., NEGOnATED
RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK 98-101 (Office of the Chairman 1990).
174. See infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
176. 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.30-.35.
177. Id. § 11.32.
178. Id. § 1l.32(a)(1)(ii)(A).
179. Id. § 11.32(a)(2).
180. Id. § 11.32(a)(1)(ii)(A). If trustees cannot reach a consensus on the designation of the lead
official, the DOI rules set out which trustee shall be designated based upon where the affected land
or water is located. Id. § I 1.32(a)(1)(ii)(A)-(D). This section also provides that if assessments may
reasonably be divided and do not overlap, they may be pursued separately by each trustee. Id. §
11.32(a)(l)(iii).
181. Id. § 11.31.
182. Id. § 11.40. See infra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
183. Id. § 11.60. See infra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
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final approval over the methodologies included in the Assessment Plan." 4
Once an Assessment Plan is established, it must be made public for
comment.'85 It has been suggested that there is an advantage in involving
interested citizens and environmental groups prior to the official public comment
period." 6 Often, these groups suggest "creative restoration options [which] are
often the most cost effective alternatives."'8 7 This also helps foster trust between
the public and government that public concerns are being addressed early on'
and may prevent legal challenges to the sufficiency of the Assessment Plan. 89
Finally, if both PRPs and the public are involved in the process, it ensures that
the NRDA addresses both industry and environmental concerns. 9
Collaborative, assisted decisionmaking has potential applicability to the
Assessment Plan Phase and has precedent in. the context of the Endangered
Species Act,' 9' the siting of hazardous waste storage facilities, 92 and in a variety
of land use planning initiatives.' 93 With wide discretion in developing damage
estimates and remedies 94 but limited resources available to conduct planning
assessments, there is reason to believe that negotiations on at least methodology
and funding issues could be productive.
Reaching consensus on at least the broad parameters of the Assessment
Plan can prevent conflict before it starts. Third party neutrals, especially
mediators, facilitators, and fact-finders, can help parties expose and understand
184. Id. § 11.60(b).
185. Id. § 11.32(c).
186. Cecil & Foster, supra note 133, at 433-34.
187. Id. at 434.
188. Dinah Bear, General Counsel for the Council on Environmental Quality, has long advocated
public participation in the NEPA process to ensure that the concerns of the parties involved are
heard, responded to, and addressed. DINAH BEAR, EPA REGION IV WORKSHOP, MUST NEPA
CONIROVERSIES MEAN WIN, LOSE OR SUE9 EXPLORING ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF ENVRONMENTrAL DIpTm
RESOLUTnON (1986).
189. Id.
190. Cecil & Foster, supra note 133, at 434.
191. For a good overview of consensus-building in the endangered species context, see STEVEN L.
YAFFEE & JULIA M. WONDOLLECK, NECOTIATING SURVIvAL: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE POTENTIAL USE OF
ALTENATwVE Dispun REsoLunoN TEc E FOR RESOLVNG CONFLi s BErwE ENDAbu SPECIES
AND DEVELOPMENT (1994). This study evaluates dispute resolution efforts involved in the recovery
implementation program for endangered fishes of the Upper Colorado River Basin, the Salmon
Summit, the negotiated rulemaking of turtle excluder devices, and the San Bruno Mountain habitat
conservation plan. Id.
192. GQISIDIER W. MOORE, INS ITUIE FOR WATER RESOURCES, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENCREHR CORPS
OF ENGINEERS USES MEDIATION To SETTLE HYDROPOWER DISPUTE (1991).
193. Nicholas Targ, Procedural Advantages of Informal Administrative Processes in the Land Use
Planning Context: Asking the Wrong Question, Again (1995) (unpublished M.B.A. thesis,
Massachusetts Inst. of Technology).
194. See e.g., supra note 142.
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differences in their basic assumptions19 and priorities'96 as these differences
become apparent.'97 If left unchecked, such differences can arise at the very end
of the process when positions are hardened and all alternatives tend to be drawn
in win-lose dichotomies. 9 '
Moreover, once the parties' assumptions and priorities are exposed,
neutrals can help parties communicate and prioritize the interests which make
competing assumptions important.'99 Parties to an NRDA dispute do not hold
dichotomous interests.20 Indeed, all parties have some interest in having the
injury remedied in a fast, efficient, and permanent manner.20' What separates the
parties is primarily how they set their priorities, and in some cases, other special
concerns.
202
By negotiating at the Assessment Plan Phase, parties do not "give up"
anything.20 3 If negotiations fail, trustees may lose some time in preparing the
195. Neutral third parties are effective at assisting parties to expose different assumptions about the
causes and impacts of particular actions. SUSSKIND ET AL., supra note 170, at 87-90. Such
differences in the NRDA context can take a variety of forms: interest or discount rates, toxic
threshold levels, the time over which harm occurs, etc. Kopp & Smith, supra note 170, at 605.
Without jointly probing and understanding basic assumptions, it is almost axiomatic that parties will
arrive at different conclusions.
196. Third parties are particularly effective at helping negotiation participants prioritize their own
interests and understand those of others. See Susan Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law
Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1357, 1374 (1991) (describing use of court-appointed special master to assist
parties to "score" issues using agreed upon methods). Unlike the interested parties, a neutral can
speak confidentially with parties, help parties to realistically evaluate alternatives, and make
suggestions without the parties having to worry about "showing weakness." Michael G. Liffing,
Which Is the Fairest Court ofAll? The Case for a Private Court System, 70 N.D. L. REV. 353, 361
nn.18-20 (1994) (adversarial negotiation does not lend itself to open and realistic appraisals of
respective parties' cases). Thus, the mediator or facilitator can help parties identify and prioritize
interests, structure possible alternatives, and determine whether continued negotiations are
worthwhile. See SUSSKIND ET AL., supra note 170, at 87-90; PRITZKER & DALTON, supra note 173, at
37.
197. See Sturm, supra note 196, at 1374. Professor Sturm describes how a court-appointed special
master in a Michigan fishing rights case helped the parties to the dispute evaluate and "score" their
concerns using an agreed-upon method. Id. Because the parties used a unified system, each interest
could be ordered and compared with others. Id.
198. Kopp & Smith, supra note 170, at 593.
199. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
200. Not only do parties have a common interest in removing both legal and financial uncertainty,
but it is likely that all parties want the environmental injury to be repaired. See Mark Sagoff, We
Have Met the Enemy and He Is Us or Conflict and Contradiction in Environmental Law, 12 ENVTL.
L. 283, 313 (1982).
201. See supra notes 143-49 and accompanying text.
202. Local residents may be especially concerned about how the actual physical remedy will be
conducted.
203. Unlike binding arbitration, discussed supra notes 35-48 and accompanying text, the neutral
would have no substantive decisionmaking authority. Because the parties have control over the
negotiating process, they must feel confident that their next best alternative (i.e., litigation) is not
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Plan, but they will also better understand where points of contention lie.20 4 With
this information, the trustees can address these areas thoroughly, indicating to
both the parties and any reviewing court that the Plan was well-considered.
Although the parties are likely to disagree on some basic issues such as
information-sharing and funding, it is unlikely that negotiations will be
completely unproductive. Based on the neutral's ability to understand and
communicate assumptions, interests, and priorities, the neutral could help parties
to the NRDA dispute make maximum use of the negotiating opportunities in the
Assessment Plan Phase.20 5
3. Assessment Phase
The next phase under the DOI rules is the Assessment Phase.2"6 This
phase consists of Injury Determination, Injury Quantification, and Damage
Determination.20 7 These determinations differ depending on whether the trustees
selected a type A or type B procedure in the Assessment Plan.208  Injury
Determination is the stage at which the trustees determine whether natural
resources have been injured and whether there is a path of exposure between the
discharge or release site and the injured resource. 2°9 Although the term "injury"
is defined under the DOI regulations as a measurable adverse change in quality
or viability of a natural resource as a result of exposure to oil or a hazardous
substance,2"' under a type B assessment, specific additional definitions of injury
are provided for surface water, ground water, air, geological, and biological
resources. 211 Once trustees establish an injury and a pathway, they proceed to
as good as the negotiation process. See LAWRENCE S. BACOW & MICHAEL WHEELER, ENVIRONMENTAL
DIsPUTE RESOLUTION 26-28 (1984).
204. See supra notes 195-202 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 195-204 and accompanying text.
206. 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.40-.84.
207. Id. § 11.60(b).
208. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text. If a type A procedure is used, minimal field
work is performed and a computer model is used to determine and quantify injuries and damages
for small discharges in marine or coastal environments. 43 C.F.R. § 11.41(a). The computer model
is called the Natural Resource Damage Assessment Model for Marine and Coastal Environments.
Id. The DOI recently proposed revising these rules. 59 Fed. Reg. 63,300 (1994). The DOI is also
developing a computer model to use in the Great Lakes. Id. at 40,319.
If a type B procedure is selected, site-specific studies must be performed and trustees must
identify and consider a reasonable number of alternatives for restoring, rehabilitating, replacing, or
acquiring equivalent resources. 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.60-.84. Trustees must document their decisions
in a Report of Assessment. Id. §§ 11.60, 11.90.
209. 43 C.F.R. § 11.61(a).
210. Id. § 11.14(v).
211. Id. § 11.62.
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Injury Quantification.212
Injury Quantification requires trustees to quantify the extent of the injuries
and determine which damages will be sought.213  This is accomplished by
measuring the resource's reduction from "baseline" conditions." 4 An example is
the reduction in "services," which are the functions that natural resources provide
for humans and other resources, such as flood control, food, or recreation.2t 5
Once injuries have been quantified, trustees must make the Damage
Determination, 2  a calculation of the money damages to be sought as
compensation for the quantified resource injuries. 2  The basic measure of
damages is the cost to restore, rehabilitate, replace, and/or acquire the equivalent
injured resources. 8 Trustees may also seek "compensable value" damages,21 9
which are damages for the economic value of services lost to the public from the
time of discharge until the completion of restoration.22°
As with other phases of the assessment, early cooperation can be
beneficial to all parties. As outlined above, the purpose of the consensual process
is to produce a good remedy and to save costs and time. 21  Because time is
saved, restoration may begin sooner, thereby reducing compensable value
damages.222
Collaborative decisionmaking can help resolve valuation issues. 3
Parties' separate damage assessment estimates frequently differ by substantial
amounts. 224 In Eagle Mine, a CERCLA-NRDA case, the State of Colorado and
other trustees' valuation was two orders of magnitude greater than the PRPs'
estimate.2" This discrepancy occurred even though both the trustees and PRPs
used very similar valuation methodologies. 26 The problem was not the scientific
212. Id. § 11.61(e)(2).
213. Id. § 11.70(a).
214. Id. § 11.70(c). A resource's "baseline" condition is the condition that would have existed
without the discharge or release. Id. § 11.72(b).
215. Id. § 11.71(e).
216. Id. § 11.80(a).
217. Id.
218. Id. § 11.80(b).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See supra notes 143-49 and accompanying text.
222. Cecil & Foster, supra note 133, at 434.
223. See generally Kopp & Smith, supra note 170. Private parties and public entities already use
ADR techniques in a variety of contexts, including: (1) contract cost overruns, see ADR
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 36, at 491, 493; (2) wage and salary disputes, id. at 501; (3) tort claims,
id. at 496; and (4) corporate worth determinations, see James C. McKinney, Federal
Communications Comm'n, Final Report of the Mediator/Facilitator in the RKO Settlement Process,
in ADR SOURCEBOOK, supra note 36, at 531, 534.
224. See Kopp & Smith, supra note 170, at 604-05.
225. Id. at 605.
226. Id.
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method or data used, but the basic assumptions that the parties' respective
counsels instructed the economists to use.227
If differences in scientific assumptions are not resolved in the Assessment
Phase, a lay trier of fact in a court proceeding must determine which set of
assumptions or methodological approach is better.228 Because the credibility of
the science, not the witness, would usually be at issue before the court in an
NRDA proceeding, an adversarial process conducted by non-technically trained
lawyers before a non-technically trained trier of fact would rarely be the most
effective way to make cutting-edge scientific determinations.22 9
One approach used to reconcile methodological and scientific assumptions
is to question the parties' expert witnesses at the same time.23° In such "tandem
witness" examinations, witnesses are asked the same questions and must respond
directly to the other's argument.' This approach serves to clarify the points of
scientific departure, the basis for disagreement, and can be used to develop
measures that test the validity of underlying assumptions.232 Techniques that
involve tandem witness examination or scientific advisory panels can increase the
accuracy of the damage assessment and reduce the transaction costs in reaching
agreement.233 Unlike much adversarial settlement bargaining, these approaches
do not attempt to effect a "zero-sum game" or "split-the-difference"
compromise."' Instead, they seek to develop, using the best science available and
objective criteria, a common understanding of the facts, the extent of the injury's
impact, and the injury's expected duration.235
The Fish and Wildlife Service ("Service") and the EPA have used
scientific panels to help resolve contentious factual determinations in a manner
analogous to that which could be used in the Assessment Phase.236 In a decision
involving the Endangered Species Act, the Service requested the assistance of
227. Id. See also supra notes 195-202 and accompanying text.
228. This problem is only likely to increase with the recent holding in Daubert v. Dow Chemicals,
Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (holding that "general acceptance" standard was not necessary
prerequisite for admissibility of scientific evidence and that trial judge is bound to ensure that
scientific experts' testimony is reliable and relevant).
229. See James P. Groton, Solving the "Conflicting Expert Witnesses" Dilemma Through ADR,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION ALTERNATIVE D sPUIE RESOLUTON CONFERENCE (1992).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id
233. Id.
234. See generally ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETrING TO YES 58-83 (1981).
235. See generally id. at 84-98.
236. See YAFFEE & WONDOLLECK, supra note 19 1, at 5-7. Professors Yaffee and Wondolleck aptly
and critically discuss the use of dispute resolution in the endangered species context. Id. See also
Peter Evans, A "Recovery" Partnershipfor the Upper Colorado River To Meet § 7 Needs, 8 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 1, 24 (1993).
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nine leading fish experts to evaluate the best scientific evidence and to report their
independent conclusions as to whether to list the Alabama Sturgeon as a protected
species.237 While the Service, of course, retained all authority in the decision
whether to list the fish,238 the Service sought expert peer review to help develop
a credible, unbiased basis for making the complex determination.239
Techniques such as tandem witness questioning and the use of scientific
panels can be employed in facilitation, mediation, or mini-trials.24° These
techniques have applicability to the NRDA process because it is a service-based
process.241 Like the other techniques discussed above,242 their use does nothing
to avoid or "privatize" the dispute.243 Rather, the consensus-building techniques
focus dispute resolution efforts on understanding the science, the facts, and the
parties' interests in an effort to avoid delay, transaction costs, and inefficient or
under-funded remedies.
4. Post-Assessment Phase
The final phase of the assessment process is the Post-Assessment Phase.244
This phase outlines the process by which the trustees prepare a final report,
present demands to PRPs, and, if necessary, file suit.24  Although DOI
regulations do not explicitly address settlement of damage claims, "[t]rustees have
authority to settle their damage claims at any time during the administrative
process. '  Furthermore, CERCLA requires the EPA to notify trustees if
settlement negotiations involving a release affecting resources are underway and
to encourage the trustees' participation in the negotiation.24 ' A trustee, however,
should not wait until the last minute to attempt to reach settlement for the reasons
addressed above.4 8 A trustee is more likely to recoup sufficient damages from
PRPs to complete a restoration plan which they have helped develop. The
237. See Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for a Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 2-6, Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition v. United
States Fish & Wildlife Serv. et al., No. CV-93-AR-2322-S (C.N.D. Ala. So. Div. 1993) [hereinafter
Memorandum].
238. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1994).
239. Memorandum, supra note 237, at 3.
240. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 143-49 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 35-127 and accompanying text.
243. Quite the contrary of avoiding disputes, consensus-building focuses the parties' attention on
the roots and facts of the dispute and separates out superficial posturing and personality conflicts.
See, e.g., supra notes 195-205, 234-35 and accompanying text.
244. 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.90-.93.
245. Id.
246. 59 Fed. Reg. 52,751. See also supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
247. 42 U.S.C. § 96220)(1).
248. See supra notes 159-75, 195-205, 221-31 and accompanying text.
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alternative is to adopt a litigation posture and "settle" for less than might have
been gained via a joint effort.249
Whether a case settles or not, the damages must be allocated among the
PRPs.50 Liability under CERCLA is joint and several."' As a result, trustees
have the option of looking to one or all PRPs for compensation of natural
resource damages. 2  However, because CERCLA allows PRPs to seek
contribution from, and allocate responsibility among, other PRPs,253 all PRPs
should be involved in the allocation of damages. Thus, it is more efficient for all
parties to reach settlement together than to negotiate with, or litigate against, each
PRP. This would be particularly productive in cases where PRPs have been
involved in the process from its earliest stages because they will have had access
to information which will help determine their proportionate liability.
Furthermore, because trustees may also be PRPs under CERCLA,254 it is in their
best interest to determine early in the assessment process what their potential
liability may be so that public money is spent in the most efficient manner.
The EPA and the Corps have used different types of ADR techniques to
resolve cost allocation disputes. 5 The EPA has used mediation as its primary
method of resolving cost allocation disputes through ADR, in part because of the
agency's desire to retain control over the decisionmaking process.256 Furthermore,
the EPA and PRPs have found that mediation's informal but structured approach
to negotiation has significant advantages beyond non-assisted negotiations. 57
These benefits include: (1) improved sharing of information;5 8 (2) development
of objective criteria for determining the allocation of costs; 259 (3) improved speed
249. While a good remedy may be developed without cooperative decisionmaking, the process used
is likely to be more resource-intensive than it needed to be. See supra notes 147-49 and
accompanying text; infra notes 275-85 and accompanying text.
250. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
251. See also In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 722 F. Supp. 893 (D. Mass. 1989).
252. D. Alan Rudlin & Michael R. Shebelskie, Natural Resources Damages Claims Under
CERCLA: A Trap for the Unwary, I ENVTL. CLAIMS J. 3, 8-9 (1988).
253. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). See also Rudlin & Shebelskie, supra note 252, at 8.
254. The CERCLA definition of liable "persons" includes the United States government and the
states. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1).
255. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, ALTERNATIVE DISPUtE RESOLUTION SERIES, CASE STUDIES # I-
12, 1989-1994. See, e.g., THE MINI-TRIAL, supra note 90; PARTNERING, supra note 97; CHRISTOPHER W.
MOORE, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, ALTEATIVE DISPUtE RESOLUTION SERIES, PAMPHLEr 91-ADR-P-
3, MEDIATION (1991) [hereinafter MEDIATION]. See also Lynn Peterson, The Promise of Mediated
Settlements of Environmental Disputes: The Experience of EPA Region V, 17 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
327 (1992).
256. Peterson, supra note 255, at 338-41.
257. Id. at 329. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
258. U.S. EPA, THE E.H. SCHILLING LANDFILL CERCLA CASE, MEDIATION CASE STUDY (1992)
[hereinafter SCHILLING LANDFILL CASE].
259. Id. at 10.
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and quality of communications through the mediator's use of "shuttle
diplomacy;"26 and (4) greater ability to negotiate through an impasse as a result
of the mediator's encouragement, interventions, and calls for "cooling-off'
periods.261
The Corps has used a mini-trial process to resolve hazardous waste cost
allocation disputes in which the Department of Defense was a PRP.262 The Corps
has chosen the mini-trial process for three principle reasons. First, this ADR
technique allows technical experts and decisionmakers to retain control over the
process, rather than having lawyers with different priorities take over.263 Second,
unlike judicial decisions, mini-trials allow for greater flexibility in possible
settlements.264 If the facts at issue are limited in scope, the "judges" can
meaningfully consider the relative strengths of the case. Finally, mini-trials allow
parties to settle their case quickly and on a set time schedule.265
The line between mediation and mini-trial can easily become blurred.
Both use a third party neutral to organize and keep the negotiations moving.266
The mediation process, however, tends to be more flexible and cooperative.267
Unlike the mini-trial, in which the decisionmakers consider opposing positions
and then negotiate an agreement, in a mediation, parties work together, preferably
before positions become hardened, to develop a joint solution.268 Mediation's
time-saving aspect may make its use more appropriate when only a small number
of parties are involved, the issues are technical, and the decisionmakers have
expertise in the subject matter.269
III. CASE STUDIES: ADVERSARIAL V. COLLABORATIVE DECISIONMAKING
Federal agency experience suggests that negotiations early in the
assessment process can reduce the amount of money spent on data collection,
increase the data's acceptability, and reduce litigation.27 State and federal agency
experience with HAZMATs under CERCLA suggests that the use of a third party
260. See Endispute, supra note 167, at 66.
261. SCHILLING LANDFILL CASE, supra note 258, at 11.
262 LAWRENCE E. SUSSKIND Er AL., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUION
SERIES, CASE STUDY #5, GOODYEAR TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY (1989).
263. Id. at 3.
264. THE MINI-TRIAL, supra note 90, at 3.
265. Id. at 4.
266. Compare id. at 1-3, 10-17 with MEDIATION, supranote 255, at 1-6. The mini-trial can be used
as a technique within a mediation to help the parties better judge the relative strengths of their
respective cases. See also supra notes 76-96 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 76-89 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 76-96 and accompanying text.
269. U.S. EPA, supra note 47, at 17.
270. See infra notes 272-94 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 20:001
THE USE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
neutral may provide additional benefits. 7 ' The following case studies illustrate
the value of early negotiation.
A. The Exxon Valdez and the Megaborg Spills
The tragedy of the Exxon Valdez oil spill2 2 will be compounded if one
does not draw lessons from what went wrong with the federal agencies'
restoration efforts.273 Although the DOI negotiated a large settlement which will
effect a substantial restoration of the injured natural resources,274 the Department
can still learn valuable lessons about ADR from the Exxon Valdez case.
Within one week after the Exxon Valdez released eleven million gallons
of oil into Prince William Sound, Exxon pledged $15 million to the damage
assessment process.27 Federal agencies, however, informed Exxon that it could
not participate in the planning of the assessment nor have access to the data
developed. 76 When the company finished its own analysis, it had spent over
$100 million.277
State and federal trustees included Alaska, NOAA, the Department of
Agriculture, and the DOI.2" Without sufficient funding and sufficient inter- or
intra-governmental coordination, the public entities conducted assessments
independently and with varying degrees of comprehensiveness.279 Because of
litigation concerns, the assessments were conducted in a closed atmosphere
without peer review.2"' In total, the trustees spent about $130 million on their
assessments before the parties reached settlement.28'
The settlement was expensive, time consuming, and not based on the best
data that could have been collected.282 The assessment should have cost
substantially less than the approximately $230 million ultimately spent by the
271. See U.S. EPA, SuPERFtND ENFORCEMENT MEDIATION: REGIONAL PILOT PROJECr RESULTS (1991);
Peterson, supra note 255, at 338-46.
272. See supra note 133 and accompanying text; Summary of Injuries to Natural Resources as a
Result of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 56 Fed. Reg. 14,687 (1991).
273. Cecil & Foster, supra note 133, at 424-25.
274. By accepting responsibility for the oil spill and agreeing to pay over $1 billion, Exxon and
the United States entered into the largest settlement for environmental damages in U.S. history.
Exxon To Pay $5 Billion in Spill, UPI, Oct. 9, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
275. Cecil & Foster, supra note 133, at 424.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 425.
282. Id.
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parties.2"3  But for the adversarial atmosphere and front-loading of data in
preparation for litigation,2"4 many millions of dollars could have been used instead
to achieve CERCLA's goal of repairing damaged natural resources.285
One year after the Exxon Valdez spill, the tanker Megaborg spilled more
than 3.9 million gallons of volatile crude oil fifty miles off the Texas coast.286
The oil ignited in a series of explosions, causing two deaths.2"7 The lead agency,
NOAA, formulated an initial "no-injury hypothesis" because the fires burned off
a portion of the oil, the tanker owner responded rapidly to clean up the spill, and
the spill did not occur near coastal areas.2
Less than ten days after the initial spill, the trustees (NOAA, the State of
Texas, and the DOI) proposed that the responsible parties jointly conduct an
initial study to determine the validity of the "no-injury hypothesis." '289 The
trustees then entered into negotiations with the responsible parties290 Within three
days of the initial study, and about two weeks after the spill, the responsible
parties and the trustees reached an agreement providing for the joint funding of
additional studies and for the sharing of all data.291  As a result of the
preassessment cooperation, the trustees were able to quickly confirm the initial
no-injury hypothesis. 292
B. Lessons To Be Learned from the Exxon Valdez and Megaborg Spills
An adversarial assessment process, such as that used in the case of the
Exxon Valdez, follows a predictable cycle crudely stated as follows. The trustees
and the PRPs perform independent assessments and valuations. The trustees then
seek damages for the injury through a "demand" letter, threatening litigation.
Rather than focusing on how to restore the resource, the parties, and, if the case
reaches litigation, the court, scrutinize the nexus between the alleged injury and
the release to determine liability and damages. Therefore, in anticipation of
litigation, the studies become oriented more toward proving or disproving liability
and undermining the others' science and findings, rather than toward documenting
the injury to the resource.
The fact that most cases settle sometime before a court assigns liability
283. See supra notes 277-81 and accompanying text.
284. Cecil & Foster, supra note 133, at 424-25.
285. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0; supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
286. Workers Preparing To Pump Crude Off Megaborg, UPI, July 17, 1990, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI File.
287. Id.
288. Cecil & Foster, supra note 133, at 425.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
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mitigates only slightly the adverse effects of noncooperative assessments.
Independently conducting an assessment in anticipation of litigation tends to
harden the parties' positions, makes any settlement harder to reach, may result in
a less tailored solution to the resource's needs, and uses scarce agency resources
inefficiently.
The Exxon Valdez and Megaborg examples contrast in more ways thanjust the ability of the parties to reach a cooperative agreement. The spills differed
in both size and impact on natural resources. Because the Megaborg spill was
smaller and further offshore, the costs were lower. In addition, NOAA had used
the one-year interval between the Exxon Valdez and Megaborg spills to develop
a response strategy that' lent itself to cooperative assessment. 93 This strategy
included improved trustee coordination and agreements on information sharing
and contingent valuation techniques." Thus, the stakes in Megaborg were
comparatively low and the conditions for settlement were good, making the
comparison between the two cases particularly stark.
IV. CONCLUSION
The contrast between the Exxon Valdez and Megaborg spills serves to
underscore the value of an early non-adversarial approach to joint scientific
inquiry into injury resulting from a release. It also raises the issue regarding what
actions the trustees can take to improve the conditions for non-adversarial
assessments. This article suggests that the use of a cooperative decisionmaking
process and the assistance of a third party neutral can help. The article does not
presume to advise agencies on how to conduct NRDAs. Rather, in furtherance
of OHA's role as ADR coordinator, it makes the suggestion based on OHA's and
other federal agencies' experiences with ADR.
293. See id.
294. Id. at 429-32.
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